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Abstract5
During the first decade of the euro, southern countries experienced a boom-bust cycle in bank lending, non-tradable6
sector growth, and capital inflows. I develop a quantitative, open economy model of banking that is consistent7
with the banks’ behavior in credit allocation and foreign borrowing observed in Spanish data. I illustrate how8
movements in the frictions of cross-border deposits generate an endogenous asymmetric allocation of bank credit9
toward non-traded sectors, while producing a persistent and climbing current account deficit. A common central10
bank’s unconventional policies in response to sudden stops are successful at ameliorating the downturn.11
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Following the creation of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), large capital flows from Euro-21
zone core to periphery were channeled through the banking sector. Financial institutions in southern countries22
experienced an unprecedented growth in their loan portfolios (e.g., Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010) which was23
largely backed by foreign deposits.1 A big portion of these loans was directed toward domestic non-traded sec-24
tors—construction and services. This contributed to an asset price boom, especially in the non-traded sectors,25
and led to an increase in wages and costs in a way that harmed export competitiveness, further worsening current26
account positions. The “rose garden” feeling disappeared with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It alerted au-27
thorities and public opinions in the Eurozone to the possibility of large violations of rules by other countries, and28
cross-border capital flows stopped quickly. Bank lending, investment, and output collapsed; the spreads between29
lending and risk-free rates rose steeply.30
To shed light on the link between bank lending, sectoral resource allocation, and external imbalances, I develop31
a quantitative two-country macroeconomic model with a financial sector in which banks lend funds to be invested32
in tradable or non-tradable sector capital and borrow from households in both countries. A decline in the frictions33
applying to cross-border deposits in domestic bank balance sheets generates the boom part of the cycle, and later,34
an instantaneous correction in the cross-border deposit frictions triggers the bust.2 The goal is to have a model that35
not only explains boom-bust periods when bank balance sheets are large but also capture the role of bank balance36
sheet composition and international factors in shock transmission and propagation within and across countries.37
The model stands on the work on incomplete market models of international business cycles, such as Benigno38
and Thoenissen (2008) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), and the work on closed economy models with39
financial intermediation, as Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (GKa and GKi, hence-40
forth).3 The model extends the agency problem in the latter literature and allows intermediaries to hold a portfolio41
of assets from different sectors and borrow from both domestic and foreign savers. As in Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki42
models, financial intermediaries can divert a fraction of assets that are funded by deposits. However, the ability of43
diverting assets that are funded by foreign creditors might differ from diverting those funded by domestic creditors.44
In addition, it is more difficult for depositors to monitor the performance of financial claims from the non-traded45
sector vis-à-vis to monitoring tradable sector assets.4 The joint analysis of financial shocks and the heterogeneity46
in bank balance sheets yields new insights on the transmission and propagation of fluctuations between sectors47
and across countries.48
Simulations indicate that the model can generate persistent current account deficits with endogenously in-49
creasing banking exposure to the non-traded sector following reductions in the financial frictions of cross-border50
deposits, and a sudden reversal of capital flows and an overall collapse in aggregate output through elevated bor-51
rowing costs of non-financials when the degree of frictions get back to their initial level. The model thus provides a52
rigorous framework for the emerging consensus on the Eurozone crisis as the outcome of financial intermediation,53
resource allocation, and a reversal of capital flows (e.g., Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015).54
A novel mechanism, that is a product of banking and trade channels that reinforce each other, operates in55
generating fluctuations. The banking channel prevails as reductions in cross-border deposit frictions contribute56
to capital inflows and credit expansion. Credit to the non-traded sector becomes cheaper due to relative difficulty57
in monitoring that asset class, and non-traded sector firms start to demand more bank funding, contributing to an58
asymmetric growth in the non-traded sector share of the economy. Furthermore, the endogenous divergence in59
intersectoral credit allocation and in the relative shares of sectors in overall economy is exacerbated by a trade60
channel, independent from the heterogeneity in bank assets. A decline in domestic real interest rates in response to61
diminishing cross-border deposit frictions drives asset and consumption prices up, making domestically produced62
goods more expensive. Consumers shift their expenditure to imports and push domestic traded good production63
down. Hence, irrespective of the heterogeneity among different asset classes in bank portfolios, capital inflows64
generate intra-national imbalances, through a trade effect. When both effects are in place, they reinforce each65
other and the model produces a data consistent outcome.66
1For instance, in Spain, only about 45 percent of total deposits in Spanish financial institutions were from the residents in 2007:QIV (e.g.,
Santos, 2014).
2The shock can be interpreted as a boost in international creditor confidence to domestic financial sector. Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010)
highlight that, after the inauguration of the euro, the perception within the EMU was no individual country would be subject to speculative
attacks and therefore, the Eurozone was contributing to a sound financial sector.
3Although the model incorporates key features of these literatures, it is not a direct merger of the papers indicated above. As highlighted
in the main text, asymmetries in bank portfolio, foreign liabilities of financial sector, and movements in international prices are crucial for
capturing data consistent model outcome.
4This assumption captures the fact that securitization associated with non-traded sector assets made the financial system obligations more













I also use the model to study unconventional monetary policy conducted by a common central bank for the two67
countries in the model, and I show that policies reminiscent of those implemented by the European Central Bank68
(ECB) help mitigate the adverse effects of sudden reversal of international capital flows. The model with policy69
does a better job at capturing the post-crisis data behavior, suggesting policy is the missing ingredient during the70
bust regime.71
In addition to the literatures on international business cycles and closed economy macro models with financial72
intermediation, this paper contributes to three other literatures. First, since the non-traded sector in my model73
includes housing, the paper contributes to the literature that argue capital inflows drive asset prices in recipient74
economies.5 This paper differentiates itself by modeling an explicit financial sector that optimizes over an infinite75
horizon and studying unconventional policy in response to sudden reversal of capital flows.76
Second, the paper contributes to a recently growing literature that investigates the role of financial interme-77
diation in open economies.6 This paper mainly distinguishes itself from previous models by two characteristics.78
First, the model distinguishes between differentiated goods produced in each country and assumes the existence of79
internationally incomplete financial markets through the banking sector. Second, the model features two sectors80
that are dependent on bank funding. The first feature implies a role for international relative prices, which interact81
with accumulation of foreign assets in internationally incomplete markets (bank deposits) in shaping the transmis-82
sion of shocks between countries through banking. The second feature allows for asset heterogeneity within each83
economy. Banks hold a portfolio of assets from both sectors, and their optimization problem leads to an additional84
channel for shock transmission across sectors.85
Third, the paper distinguishes itself from the literature that studies the effect of financial frictions in a macroe-86
conomic setting by the description of the shock. The shock is linked with both international and financial aspects87
of the model.7 Specifically, I characterize the boom period as a reduction in the financial frictions of cross-border88
deposits, and the bust, by moving this friction back to its initial value.89
To my knowledge, this paper is also the first to study central bank asset purchases and liquidity facilities in a90
boom-bust scenario.91
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the outcome92
of the model without policy, when calibrated to a standard open economy. Section 4 describes the central bank’s93
unconventional policy and discusses its results. Section 5 concludes.94
2. Model95
I start with presenting the physical setup—a no-distortion two-country model, which allows non-tradable96
inputs in the production process—, and then, I add financial frictions within and across countries. The setup of97
the model assumes that the law of one price holds, and sources of PPP deviations are home bias in preferences98
and the presence of non-traded goods in the economy. Banks are channelling funds from households (savers) to99
non-financial firms (borrowers), and their ability of intermediation is limited due to a moral hazard problem which100
is explained in the following sections. Banks are able to raise deposits from households in both countries, and101
provide funding to domestic two non-financial sectors.8102
In what follows, I focus on Home economy and, otherwise indicated, Foreign is symmetric.103
2.1. Physical Setup104
The world is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.105
Each country is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households with some fraction supplying labor to tradable106
and non-tradable intermediate good production.107
Non-financial firms in tradable and non-tradable sectors produce output using a Cobb-Douglas production108
function which combines capital and labor:109




i,t i ∈ {T,NT }, (1)
where subscript T denotes the tradable sector variables, and NT denotes non-tradable sector variables.110
5Among others, this literature includes Coimbra (2010), Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2016), Punzi (2013).
6See Cacciatore et al. (2014), Dedola et al. (2013), Kollmann et al. (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Nuguer (2016), and Reis
(2013).
7Among others, Del Negro et al. (2017) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) use a similar mechanism to motivate disruption in financial
markets in a closed economy setting, and Dedola et al. (2013) conduct experiments with financial shocks without distinguishing cross-border
deposits.
8I focus on a real model, because this setting is sufficient to generate the importance of financial market frictions on real activity. It is













There are two types of capital producers, each of them producing capital for a respective sector. The law of111
motion of capital for each capital producer is subject to convex adjustment costs, and in the aggregate they follow112
the process:113
Ki,t+1 = (1 − δ)Ki,t + Ii,t − f ( Ii,tKi,t )Ki,t i ∈ {T,NT }, (2)
where f (•) denotes the convex adjustment costs.114
Non-financial goods producers obtain capital for the use in the next period by issuing claims S i,t, at the price of115
the capital, Qi,t. By the assumption of no-arbitrage, value of claims should be equal to the value of capital bought116
by non-financials:117
Qi,tKi,t+1 = Qi,tS i,t i ∈ {T,NT }. (3)
The representative household consists of a family, in which workers in the family are divided into two, each118
group supplying labor to firms for tradable or non-tradable goods production. The whole family jointly maximize119
an inter-temporal utility function that derives utility from household’s consumption of basket of goods, Ct, and120
disutility from supplying labor to tradable and non-tradable good production, LT,t and LNT,t, respectively:121
U(Ct, LT,t, LNT,t) =
C1−ρt








Within this setting, relative hours spent respond less to sectoral wage differentials due to sector specificity.122
Households enjoy consumption of an Armington aggregate of composite tradable and non-traded goods. The123





T,t + (1 − aT )1/κC(κ−1)/κNT,t
]κ/(κ−1)
, (5)
where CT,t is the consumption of the composite traded good, and CNT,t is the consumption of non-traded good.125
The parameter aT denotes the share of tradables in final consumption, and κ is the intratemporal elasticity of126
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods.127





H,t + (1 − aH)1/ωC(ω−1)/ωF,t
]ω/(ω−1)
, (6)
where CH,t is the consumption of the traded good produced in Home, and CF,t is the consumption of the traded129
good produced in Foreign. The parameter ω is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between Home and130
Foreign goods, and there is home-bias in consumption if aH > 12 .131
Market clearing in each sector requires that Home production equals Home and Foreign consumption, and132
investment:133
YT,t = CH,t + C
∗
H,t + IT,t, YNT,t = CNT,t + INT,t. (7)
This frictionless economy is the bare-bone model. In what follows, I focus on the decentralized economy, and134
introduce financial frictions that will impede flow of funds within and across countries.135
2.2. Households136
The representative household in each country consists of a fraction of g bankers, and 1 − g workers. Bankers137
manage financial intermediaries and transfer their earnings back to the household, and workers similarly return138
their income back to the household. Households do not provide funds to non-financial firms nor do they acquire139
capital. They deposit funds to financial intermediaries that they are not related with, and therefore there is perfect140
consumption insurance within the household. Intermediaries raise funds from households only by offering non-141
contingent risk-less short term debt (deposits).142
Households maximize expected inter-temporal utility from consumption, Ct, net of disutility from providing143
labor to traded and non-traded sectors, LT,t and LNT,t, as given by E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tU(Ct, LT,t, LNT,t), where U(•) is144
expressed in (4).145
Households in each country hold one-period deposits supplied by Home and Foreign intermediaries. I assume146
that deposits pay risk-free consumption-based real returns. Households enter period t with deposits of Home and147
Foreign intermediaries, Bt and ξtB∗,t, in units of home consumption, where ξt represents the real exchange rate.9148
9Similarly, Foreign households hold deposits at Foreign and Home intermediaries, which are denoted as B∗∗,t and
B∗t
ξt














They receive gross income on deposits and labor income, and allocate these resources between consumption and149
purchases of deposits to be carried next period. The period budget constraint in units of consumption is150
Ct + Bt+1 + ξtB∗,t+1 +
η
2ξt(B∗,t+1)
2 = RHt Bt + ξtR
H
t





2 is the cost of adjusting holdings of Foreign deposits, RHt and R
H
t
∗ are gross interest rates received151
after holding Home and Foreign deposits, respectively. T f ∗t is the fee rebate, taken as given by the household, and152
equal to η2ξt(B∗,t+1)
2 in the equilibrium, and Tt is the lump-sum transfers. The representative Foreign household153
faces a similar constraint in units of foreign consumption. Introducing convex adjustment costs ensures that zero154
foreign deposit holding is the unique steady state, and hence economies go back to their initial position after155
temporary fluctuations.10 ΠT,t, ΠNT,t, and ΠB,t represent the profits back to household by traded and non-traded156
sector workers, and intermediaries, respectively.157
Home household maximizes expected discounted utility subject to (8). The Euler equations for deposit hold-158








































. They ensure that the marginal rate of162
substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to the respective wage rate in each sector.163











where PH , PT and P∗T denote the relative prices of Home traded goods, composite traded goods, and Foreign com-165
posite traded goods. The conditions for the Foreign traded goods are analogous.166
Similarly, the generic demand curve for Home non-traded and composite traded goods are given by CNT,t =167
(1 − aT ) (PNT,t)−κ Ct and CT,t = aT (PT,t)−κ Ct.168
2.3. Firms169
There are two types of producers in each sector, namely goods producers and capital producers.170
2.3.1. Goods Producers171
Goods are produced under perfect competition in both sectors. The production technology at time t is given as172
a constant returns to scale function, F(KT,t, LT,t) for tradable good producers, and F(KNT,t, LNT,t) for non-tradable173
good producers as in (1).174
Firms finance their capital expenditures in each period by issuing claims. Firms derive revenues from selling175
their good and selling the undepreciated portion of the physical capital back to capital producers, after production.176
On the cost side, they pay laborers and pay intermediaries interest for the claims S i,t−1. Marginal product of177
capital is as standard in the literature, and given by Zi,t ≡ Pii,tYi,t−wi,t Li,tKi,t = Pii,tFKi,t (Ki,t, Li,t), where i ∈ {T,NT } and178
ii ∈ {H,NT }.179
Banks can perfectly monitor and evaluate the non-financial firms, and hence, every financial contract between180
the non-financials and intermediaries delivers its promises. Goods producing firms obtain zero profits state-by-181
state, and the ex-post return on capital is fully paid out to the financial intermediary. Accordingly, ex-post return182













10It will be clear when studying the banking sector that Home deposit holding is pinned down with the deposit market clearing condition
and it is non-zero in the steady-state. Hence, there is no need for a convex adjustment cost for Home deposits to ensure that it has a unique
steady state.
11Introducing time varying frictional costs for cross-border deposits implies a wedge between RH and RH∗ in equilibrium, and introduce

















The interest paid out to the intermediary varies with the marginal product of capital and with the fluctuations in185
prices. The latter is due to the transaction with capital producers. In each sector, firms also choose labor demand186
as follows:187
wi,t = Pii,tFLi (Ki,t, Li,t). (12)
Labor demand conditions state that the marginal product of labor in each sector should be equal to the respec-188
tive wage rate.189
2.3.2. Capital Producers190
Capital producers produce new capital that will be used by goods producers in the subsequent period. They191
decide for investment after buying the used capital from goods producers. The price of capital is equal to the192
marginal cost of investment goods production:193
Qi,t =
1
1 − fI( Ii,tKi,t )Ki,t
. (13)
Capital adjustment costs cause asset prices to deviate from unity and contribute to the financial accelerator194
mechanism as standard in the literature.195
2.4. Financial intermediaries196
Financial intermediaries obtain funds from both Home and Foreign households, and lend to domestic firms197
operating in traded and non-traded sectors. Moreover, intermediaries can raise funds through their own net worth198
(bank capital), which is accumulated through their earnings.199
The value of funds extended to each sector is equal to the price, Qi,t, times the quantity of claims on non-200
financial firms held by intermediary j, S i,t( j). Intermediaries fund their assets by their own net worth and the total201
amount of deposits raised from Home and Foreign households. Hence, the intermediary balance sheet takes the202
following form:203
QT,tS T,t( j) + QNT,tS NT,t( j)︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
Assets
= Bt+1( j) + B
∗





Let RFt be the interest rate from t − 1 to t that is paid out to Foreign households. The earnings of an individual204
Home intermediary j in period t is the payoff from total assets funded in the previous period net of cost of deposits205
raised from Home and Foreign:206
Nt( j) = Rk,T,tQT,t−1S T,t−1( j) + Rk,NT,tQNT,t−1S NT,t−1( j) − RHt Bt( j) − RFt B∗t ( j) (15)
To rule out the possibility of intermediaries’ accumulating enough wealth to end their need to raise funding207
from households, intermediaries are assumed to be finitely lived. Each period, with probability 1 − γ, bankers208
switch occupations. Exiting bankers bring their end-of-period bank capital back to their household, and en-209
tering bankers receive funding right before they start business. Thus, every period (1 − γ)g intermediaries210
exit and enter, and the number of workers and bankers is kept unchanged. Accordingly, the bankers’ objec-211
tive is to maximize their terminal net worth, which is the net present value of future earnings, before they exit:212
Vt = Et
[∑∞
s=1(1 − γ)γs−1βΛt,t+sNt+s( j)
]
.213
Following GKa, GKi, and as earlier in Holmström and Tirole (1997), there exists an agency problem between214
intermediaries and households. After collecting deposits, intermediaries can divert funds to the household that215
they are a member of. In this case, depositors can force the intermediary into bankruptcy and recover a fraction216
of the assets that the intermediary is holding. The fraction that can be recovered depends on the type of asset.217
Creditors retrieve 1 − λNT of non-traded and 1 − λT fraction of traded sector assets in the event of bankruptcy.218
Moral hazard restricts the amount lent by households, but the tightness of the constraint in domestic and foreign219
deposit markets might differ. In particular, intermediaries face additional difficulty in diverting assets that are220
funded by foreign deposits.221
Let Vt(Nt( j)) be the maximized value of Vt, given intermediaries’ period retained earnings. The following222
incentive constraint will suffice to prevent intermediaries to run away with their assets:223
Vt(Nt( j)) ≥ λT [QT,tS T,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1] + λNT [QNT,tS NT,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1]. (16)
The variable ιt denotes the relative degree of friction applying to foreign deposits, and variation in it can be224


















(1 − γ) Nt( j) + γ
(





subject to (14), (15), and (16).227
I guess and verify that the banks’ value function is linear in their net worth, i.e. Vt(Nt( j)) = νtNt( j). First order228



















= µt(λT + λNT )ιt, (20)
with232







λT [QT,tS T,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1] + λNT [QNT,tS NT,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1]
 . (21)
In the above conditions, µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the banker’s program; Ωt is the shadow233
value of a unit of net worth to the banker at time t, which is given by Ωt ≡ (1 − γ + γνt), averaging the exiting and234
continuation states; and νt is the marginal value of net worth.12235
Absent financial frictions, i.e. µt = 0, bankers acquire deposits until the discounted cost of deposits is equal236
to the gain from lending to non-financial firms. The cost of Home and Foreign deposits are equal to each other as237
there is no asset diversion. In that case, banks’ value function is equal to their net worth (i.e. νt = 1), indicating an238
equivalence of the stochastic discount factors of agents in the economy (i.e. βΛt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1Ωt+1). The differences239
between returns from non-tradable sector and tradable sector and between costs of Home and Foreign deposits240
vanish.241
When intermediaries’ incentive constraint binds, the spreads between the gains from lending to non-financial242
firms and the cost of borrowing from Home households are non-zero in the equilibrium, and they are scaled by243
the divertable proportion of assets in each sector. The magnitudes of spreads depend not only on how tight the244
incentive constraint is binding for the banker but also on the types of assets in the intermediary balance sheet.13245
With λNT > λT , non-traded sector borrows initially at higher spreads.14 A relaxation in the financial constraint (i.e.246
µt going down) implies a greater fall in the non-traded sector interest rate spread vis-á-vis to traded sector spread.247
Therefore, in response to an increase in ιt, intermediaries expand credit by more to the non-traded sector as it248
relaxes the incentive constraint by more, and non-traded sector firms demand more credit as it becomes cheaper.249
The spread between the interest rate to Home and Foreign deposits depends on the degree of divertibility of250
assets funded by Foreign households, in addition to how tight the incentive constraint is binding. For a given value251
of µt, if it is harder to divert any assets backed by Foreign funding, RFt+1 − RHt+1 increases accordingly. If there is252
no difference between Home and Foreign financing, interest rates paid out to Home and Foreign deposits are the253
same. The intuition behind positive spreads is that a unit of Foreign deposit allows Home intermediaries to expand254
assets by greater amount and intermediaries are willing to pay a premium for this advantage.15255
The linearity of the value function helps us to write the incentive constraint in the following form:256





When intermediary net worth is low, limits to arbitrage on intermediary portfolio leads to a maximum ratio of257
assets to net worth that satisfies the incentive constraint. In this case, the total amount of lending to non-financial258
firms is limited by the intermediary’s net worth. Importantly, in this setting, a decline in the frictional costs of259
cross-border bank deposits (an increase in ιt) also relax the leverage constraint for a given level of net worth,260
12A detailed solution of the banker’s problem is available in the Online Appendix.
13It is also useful to note that the heterogeneity in the divertibility of assets prevents the indeterminacy problem of intermediary portfolio
allocation.
14As discussed in Section 3.1, this is a data consistent assumption.
15It is crucial to note that a change in the spread, RFt+1 − RHt+1, is dependent both on how tight the incentive constraint is binding and on
the degree of frictions applying to Foreign deposits. From (21), one can observe that, an increase in ιt relaxes banks’ constraint, by making
it harder to divert assets funded by Foreign deposits, and from (20) it contributes to a positive spread between Home and Foreign deposit
rates in the bank balance sheet, given µt . However, µt and ιt affect (20) through opposite signs and the direction of the spread will depend on














introducing an additional mechanism for the movements in the leverage constraint. Intermediaries are able to261
expand greater amount of assets as the confidence of international creditors arise.262
Finally, the solution to the bankers’ problem reads as marginal value of an additional bank net worth can be263






1 − µt . (23)
The value from additional unit of net worth varies counter-cyclically. In the case of an economic downturn,265
bankers’ incentive constraint gets tighter, sectoral spreads increase, and an additional unit of bank net worth266
becomes more valuable. Conversely, during the boom periods, bankers’ incentive constraint relaxes, and the267
continuation value is lower than the previous case.268
2.5. Equilibrium269
Market clearing conditions in securities, deposits, goods and labor markets are required to close the model.270
The equilibrium in goods market in both sectors in Home is given by (7). A similar condition also holds in Foreign.271
Market clearing for securities imply that the total supply of financial claims from firms is equal to the total272
amount of capital bought from respective sectors, as given in (3).273
The equilibrium deposit market condition requires that total demand on deposits by Home and Foreign house-274
holds should be equal to the aggregate bank assets net of bank net worth:275
Bt+1 + B
∗
t+1 = QT,tS T,t + QNT,tS NT,t − Nt. (24)
Aggregate net worth is the sum of entering and existing bankers’ net worth,276
Nt = (γ + ε)[(ZT,t + (1 − δ)QT,t)S T,t−1 + (ZNT,t + (1 − δ)QNT,t)S NT,t−1] − γ(RHt Bt + RH∗t B∗t ), (25)
where ε denotes the fraction of assets of exiting bankers, distributed back to entering bankers.277
And, labor demand equals labor supply, implying:278




Similar conditions hold also in Foreign.279
Finally, under international incomplete markets, equilibrium allocation depends on the net foreign asset po-280
sition at the beginning of each period. There is a net profit transfer from capital producers and bankers to the281
household that they are a member of. The profit of the banker is the assets taken upon exiting net of transfer to282
entrants.16283
The equations (1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25) together with respective demand and284
price equations, consumption-labor tradeoffs marginal product of capital, and their Foreign counterparts, in which285
(1, 2, 3, 11 ,12, 13) have analogous components in traded and non-traded sectors, together with the net foreign286
asset condition determine the endogenous variables (YT,t, YNT,t, KT,t+1, KNT,t+1, S T,t, S NT,t, Ct, CT,t, CH,t, CF,t,287
CNT,t, IT,t, INT,t, LT,t, LNT,t, ZT,t, ZNT,t, RHt+1,R
F
t+1,Rk,T,t, Rk,NT,t, QT,t, QNT,t, PT,t, PNT,t, PH,t, PF,t, wT,t, wNT,t, ξt, νt,288
µt, Nt, Bt+1, B∗,t+1) and their Foreign counterparts as a function of the state variables (IT,t−1, INT,t−1, KT,t, KNT,t,289
RHt Bt, R
H
t B∗,t) and their Foreign counterparts, together with the exogenous shock processes.290
3. Model Calibration and Simulations291
This section presents the numerical analysis from the simulations of the model. I start with discussing the292
calibration and then move to simulations to illustrate the model’s success in capturing Spanish data. I further293
disentangle the channels at work to explain the transmission and propagation mechanisms.294
3.1. Calibration295
The depreciation rate, δ, capital share, α, households’ discount factor, β, are set to their standard values in296
the literature, to 0.025, 0.33, and 0.995, respectively. With regards to the adjustment costs of foreign deposit297
holdings, η, I use 0.0025 as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Moreover, the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of298
substitution from consumption, ρ, is set to 2 as standard, and following GKa the inverse of the Frisch elasticities299













in traded and non-traded sectors, ϕ1 are set to 0.276, and ϕ2 to 0.276, and following GKi the relative weight of300









for every i ∈ {T,NT }. Following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and ϕK is set to 5.302
For the parameters that are of importance for the international dynamics, again, conventional values are used.303
The elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign produced traded goods, ω, is set to 1.2 as in Ghironi304
(2006) among others, and following Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) the elasticity of substitution between traded and305
non-traded goods, κ, is set to 1. The share of home-produced intermediate inputs in the tradable intermediate306
input, aH , is fixed to 0.55, and share of tradables in the final consumption, aT to 0.55, which are both in line with307
the Eurozone data.308
Which is not standard in the literature is the calibration of this model’s financial sector variables. The fractions309
of divertable capital in each sector, λT and λNT , are sector specific, and they capture the heterogeneity between310
financial claims in the bank balance sheet. I pick these parameters to hit the following targets: a home steady311
state interest rate spread in the tradable sector of 40 bps and a steady state interest rate spread in the non-tradable312
sector of 120 bps, implying a greater share of divertibility of non-traded sector assets. I choose a larger interest313
rate spread for the financial claims of non-tradables, for several reasons. Using mortgage loans as a proxy for314
non-traded sector credit, the differential spread between the 2003-2015 average mortgage rate and the rate on315
loans to non-financial corporations is positive.17 Moreover, securitization in non-traded sector related financial316
assets is linked with low lending standards, and makes the obligations of financial system more opaque (e.g.,317
Brunnermeier, 2009), which provides justification for a higher λNT .18 In Spain, the increase in non-traded sector318
asset prices is linked with securitization of real estate assets, latter affecting the credit supply (e.g., Jiménez, et al.,319
2010 and Carbó-Valverde et al., 2012).19,20,21 To calibrate the steady state value of ιt, the steady state real interest320
rate spread between Home and Foreign deposits is set to 158bps, to match the difference between the 1993-1999321
and 1999-2015 average of the short-term real interest rate spread between Spain and Germany, using OECD data.322
I also use a steady state leverage ratio in the range of values in the literature and set it to 6. Finally, my choices323
of the proportional transfers to entering intermediaries, ε, and the survival probability of intermediaries, γ, are324
in line with the literature. ε is set to 0.0001 and γ is fixed to 0.975, setting an average horizon of 10 years for325
intermediaries. Table 1 summarizes the parametrization.326
3.2. Foreign Bank Financing and Macroeconomic Dynamics327
In what follows, I discuss the performance of the model with respect to its abilities of capturing Spanish data,328
and then I identify the underlying channels at work by comparing dynamics when the heterogeneity in banking329
sector is turned on and off. Namely, calibrating λNT = λT abstracts from the heterogeneity in banking sector and330
isolates the trade channel, whereas λNT > λT allows banking channel to operate.331
3.2.1. Specification332
The main experiment, a decline in the frictional costs of cross-border bank deposits, is captured by movements333
in ιt. Given ιt = ιeψt , the shock specification for the induction of model dynamics is as follows:334
ψt = ρψψt−1 + εt,
where εt represents a white noise error in forecasting ψt that is based on its own past.335
In line with my motivation of the recent boom-bust period in Southern Eurozone, I feed into the model a336
sequence of shocks to εt, each quarter allowing for a 50 percent reduction in the frictional costs of cross-border337
deposits from 1999:QIV up until the crisis in 2008:QI, for 33 periods. The persistence is 0.99 because joining to338
the Eurozone was seen as an irreversible event.22 The crisis reveals itself as a loss of confidence of international339
creditors in Home financial conditions, and in period 33 there is a counteracting shock that takes ιt back to its340
1999:QIV value. Hence, the crisis is induced by a sudden-stop of cross-border capital flows.341
17The data is available from 2003. Sources are Bank of Spain and National Institute of Statistics (INE).
18Keys et al. (2010) also provide empirical evidence on the causal relationship from increased securitization to a decline in bank lending
quality.
19According to these authors, although the size of securitization was negligible before the year 2000, the stock of securitized assets were
about 30% of total bank credit in year 2008.
20In a diff-in-diff setup (using Spanish data), the securitization related with non-traded sector assets is also associated with a more pro-
nounced decrease in mortgage rates during the boom period. The link between securitization and non-traded sector boom-bust periods is
recurrent in the history of financial crises such as the case in the central European crisis of 1931.
21As discussed in Section 3.2.3, λNT > λT contributes to divergence in intersectoral bank lending.
22The magnitude of persistence and the level of shocks contribute to the quantitative fit of the model dynamics to the data. Qualitative
features are invariant under a milder process. In reality, there are also non-financial factors that affect the dynamics and a model that combines














I investigate the ability of the model to match the Spanish data. Figure 1 compares generated model dynamics343
when there is a reduction in the frictional costs of Foreign deposits in Home bank balance sheet with the data.23344
Panel A plots Spain’s current account-to-GDP ratio over the period 2000:QI to 2009:QIV as deviations from345
1999:QIV. The model variable is the current account. Panel B plots the percent deviation of lending of credit346
institutions to non-financial sectors in Spain (per GDP), normalized in 1999:QIV, and compares it with the model347
variables, QT S T and QNT S NT . Purple line indicates lending to non-tradable sectors and blue line indicates lending348
to tradable. Panel C exhibits the share of non-traded sectors in overall gross value added as percent deviations349
from its 1999:QIV value. The data consistent model variable is YNTYT +YNT .350
Reduction in the frictional costs of cross-border deposits induces an increase in the holdings of Foreign de-351
posits of Home banks and generate an expansion of banking sector assets, while driving an endogenous skewed352
allocation towards non-traded non-financials and creating a boom in the non-traded sector, affecting its share in353
overall economy. The model reasonably captures the pattern of current account balance and the divergence in354
bank credit between traded and non-traded sectors during the boom era.355
The shocks to cross-border deposit frictions enter through equations (20) and (21). From (21), it is observed356
that an increase in ιt relaxes bank constraints, leading to a decrease in bank Lagrangian multiplier, µt. The decline357
in µt and the increase in ιt create offsetting effects for the spread between Foreign and Home deposits in Home358
bank balance sheets, but the latter effect prevails, contributing to a positive spread. An increase in RFt attracts359
Foreign deposits and generates a persistent and climbing current account deficit. On the other hand, there is360
no offsetting effect for the spreads between lending and borrowing rates to non-financials, and a decline in µt361
triggers a decline in lending spreads. The decrease in the non-traded sector spreads is more pronounced as the362
moral hazard parameter for non-tradable, λNT , is larger, making credit to non-tradable cheaper. Hence, non-363
traded sectors demand more funding from intermediaries and credit allocation becomes asymmetric, contributing364
to increasing share of non-tradables in overall gross value added. In the data, non-traded sector receives more365
credit, possibly reflecting domestic factors, such as beliefs about future asset prices of domestic residents and366
over-investing asymmetrically in non-traded sectors, which is not studied in the model.367
After 2008:QI, with a sudden stop of cross-border bank finance, credit spreads in each sector jump and bank368
funding becomes more expensive. Due to higher fluctuations in credit spreads of non-traded sectors (due to the369
mechanism explained above), funding to non-tradables is reduced more heavily. Credit to the non-traded sector370
and the sector’s relative share respond in a more pronounced manner vis-à-vis to the data after sudden reversal of371
capital flows. One of the reasons of a more pronounced bust is the absence of policy interventions by ECB in the372
current model. After unconventional policy is introduced into the model in the next section, it does a better job in373
capturing the post-crisis period.374
The mechanism above is what I call the banking channel. To understand the separate roles of heterogeneity in375
banking and international prices, the next subsection presents counter-factual experiments when the heterogeneity376
between bank assets is turned on and off.377
3.2.3. Three Model Versions378
As discussed in the previous subsection, the model captures the key features of bank funding, sectoral allo-379
cation, and external borrowing of the Spanish boom-bust cycle. To further understand the contribution of hetero-380
geneity in bank assets in generating these dynamics, three model versions are compared with each other.381
All else being the same, I first set λT = λNT =0.1892 by choosing a steady state spread of 20bps in each sector382
and call this version low lambda model. Then, I set λT = λNT =0.5627 by choosing the steady state spreads equal383
to 120bps, and call this version high lambda model. In Figure 2, black lines show the dynamics from the former,384
and the purple lines show the dynamics from the latter. Blue lines show model dynamics for the baseline model.385
One might expect similar movements in bank funding to both sectors when the moral hazard parameter is386
the same across sectors. However, it is not the case. Even in the absence of heterogeneity among different asset387
classes (i.e. λT = λNT ), under the high lambda model, it is observed that banks extend more credit to non-traded388
sector, and under the low lambda model, more credit to traded sector. The reason is that movements in frictional389
costs of cross-border deposits affect the tightness of banks’ incentive constraint in different magnitudes.390
Under the high lambda model, banks’ constraint relaxes less than the other cases. From equation (20), it can391
be observed that movements in ιt offset the decrease in µt in a more pronounced manner and contribute to a larger392
spread between Foreign and Home deposits in bank balance sheets. Due to relative decline in Home interest393
rate, relative prices of Home tradable goods become more expensive and households shift their consumption of394
Home traded good with imported goods. This contributes to a larger current account deficit and shrinks the size of395
Home traded sector, contributing to lower credit demand from traded sector goods producers. Although there is no396













heterogeneity in the banking sector assets, a decline in the friction of cross-border deposits create an intra-national397
imbalance as well as an international imbalance. This is what I call the trade channel.398
The trade channel is also prevalent in the baseline model, as credit expansion to non-traded sector is larger399
than the ratio of λNT
λT
. In the baseline, when non-tradable sector credit spreads decline in a more pronounced way,400
non-traded sector firms demand more credit, relative prices in Home fall, households shift their consumption to401
imported goods, enforcing further downward pressure on the size of traded sector during the boom. Banking402
channel (i.e. λNT > λT ) reinforces trade channel.403
During the bust, there is an instantaneous intra-national rebalancing leading to a one time hike in the traded404
output, under the baseline model. This effect is not present in other two versions as the credit spreads move405
equally. When the sudden stop of cross border bank finance induces positive spreads in the non-traded sector,406
firms in traded sector demand more credit as it becomes relatively cheaper. However, this effect fades away as the407
cost of credit is still above its steady state value during the bust periods.408
Finally, it is observed that under the low lambda model, trade channel works through the opposite direction.409
Movements in µt offset the opposite movement in ιt, creating a negative spread between Foreign and Home deposits410
in Home bank balance sheets. Increase in Home relative interest rate makes Home goods relatively cheaper and411
households decrease imports, increase exports, contributing to a larger growth in the traded sector.412
4. Unconventional Central Bank Policies413
A central bank, constrained by the zero-lower-bound, can intervene in markets by increasing demand on non-414
financial private sector assets, or by supplying further funding to the banking sector to overcome the restriction on415
the size of banks’ portfolio of assets over their internal equity.416
The policies that I am studying here are different than those in the recent literature by the choice of funding417
for intervention—resources for intervention are raised from banks instead of from households—, by its response418
to sector specific variables, and by its conduct in an international environment inducing public capital flows.419
The assumption of the unconventional policy financed by interest-bearing reserves is in line with the evidence420
obtained from the Eurosystem balance sheet, which exhibits an increase in deposit liabilities of the Eurosystem421
from Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs) after the start of the ECB unconventional policies in early 2008,422
indicative for the resources of the ECB firepower.423
In what follows, the policy applications are examined in greater detail.424
4.1. Asset Purchases425
After the financial crisis, ECB started its private asset purchase program as a mean of using its powers as a426
lender of last resort. The relevant ECB announcement24 indicated that these policies were mainly targeted toward427
acquiring non-traded sector assets.428
Building motivation from this case, I assume that a global central bank has the option of intermediating a429
fraction ϕumpT,t of total domestic tradable, and a fraction ϕ
ump
NT,t of non-tradable sector funding needs. In particular,430
now the central bank can purchase S gT,t ≡ ϕumpT,t S T,t, or S gNT,t ≡ ϕumpNT,tS NT,t, in fractions of total sectoral assets.431
The private assets intermediated by the financial intermediaries are denoted with S pT,t ≡ (1 − ϕumpT,t )S T,t, and432
S pNT,t ≡ (1 − ϕumpNT,t)S NT,t, respectively. Deviating from the previous literature, I specify the fractions of the assets433
intermediated by the central bank as autoregressive processes with an innovation that occurs at the same time of434
the sudden reversal of capital flows, at t = 33. That is:435
ϕ̂
ump





with i ∈ {T,NT }.25 Capped variables indicate the deviations from their non-stochastic steady-state.436
To finance these purchases, central bank issues debt to banks at rate Rg,t+1, and banks fund this activity by437
issuing deposits to Home and Foreign households at the risk-free rate. The rate Rg,t+1 is the interest that will be438
paid by central bank to the financial intermediary between periods t and t + 1, and it is known in period t. Central439










In this setting, Bgt and B
∗g
∗,t can be thought of as interest bearing reserves of Home and Foreign intermediaries441
at the central bank’s account. In equilibrium, the global central bank raises equal amount of resources from each442
24See Decision ECB/2014/45, November 19, 2014.
25I also choose ρϕumpi













country (i.e. Bgt = ξtB
∗g
∗,t), as the sizes of the countries are equal to each other. Moreover, following the previous443
literature, I introduce inefficiency costs of τT and τNT per unit of private funding intermediated in each sector. If444
banks’ constraints are not binding, these costs make the central bank intervention inefficient.445
Now, the financial intermediary balance sheets become446
QT,tS
p
T,t( j) + QNT,tS
p
NT,t( j)︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
Private Assets
+ Bgt ( j)︸︷︷︸
Interest-Bearing Claims
= Bt+1( j) + B
∗





with the incentive constraint now also indicating the banks’ ability to divert central bank debt in the case of default:447
Vt(Nt( j)) ≥ λT [QT,tS pT,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1] + λNT [QNT,tS pNT,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1] + λECBBgt ( j), (29)
Here, it is easier for Home depositors to monitor the performance of central bank debt than the performance448
of private asset portfolios, and hence, the former is subject to a lower degree of bank malfeasance. In particular,449
in the quantitative analysis of this section, w.l.o.g. I assume λECB ≡ λT2 .450
4.2. Liquidity Facilities451
An alternative unconventional policy that is more reminiscent of the LTROs26 of the ECB is liquidity facilities452
conducted by the common central bank in the model. Under this policy alternative, the central bank lends funds453
to financial intermediaries, which in turn will lend to non-financial private firms.454
I assume that the central bank provides non-contingent funding, Mt+1, to banks, at a rate, Rm,t+1, which is455
known in period t. Financial intermediary balance sheets take the following form456
QT,tS T,t( j) + QNT,tS NT,t( j) + B
g
t ( j) = Bt+1( j) + B
∗
t+1( j) + Mt+1( j)︸  ︷︷  ︸
Discount Window Lending
+Nt( j). (30)
The financial intermediary’s non-tradable sector firm assets and interest bearing reserves are eligible collateral457
for the central bank liquidity facilities. Hence, for any unit of discount window lending, a borrowing bank cannot458
divert any of those assets:459
Vt(Nt( j)) ≥ λT [QT,tS T,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1( j)] + λNT [QNT,tS NT,t( j) − ιtB∗t+1( j) − Mt+1] + λECB(Bgt ( j) − Mt+1( j)). (31)
Liquidity facilities will loosen the binding constraints, depending on whether the relaxation induced by liquid-460
ity injection offsets the additional friction borne from the divertibility of interest bearing claims.461
Finally, the magnitude of liquidity facilities are determined by a similar rule as in the case of private asset462
purchases, yielding to the following relationship:463
Mt+1 = ϕ
ump





NT,t are given by (27).464
4.3. Experiments under Unconventional Central Bank Policies465
I conduct simulations, with ϕumpT,t = 0 and u
ump
NT,t initiates in 2008:QI at the same time with the sudden reversal466
of capital flows. I set the magnitude of the unconventional policy to 5, implying an absolute deviation of 500 from467
zero.27 Hence, I investigate the policy’s contribution to model performance when it is conducted in response to468
non-traded sector variables.469
Figure 3 exhibit the model’s performance with respect to the Spanish data, when the combination of central470
bank asset purchase program and liquidity facilities is in place. As discussed in section 3.2.2, including policy in471
the model improves the model’s post-crisis performance. The collapse in bank credit toward non-tradable sectors472
is less pronounced because policy is strong enough to take the credit spreads to the negative territory and making473
non-traded sector credit cheaper again vis-à-vis to traded sector credit. Global central bank is channeling funds474
from Foreign to Home and private capital outflows are partially replaced by public capital inflows. Because there475
26To address the illiquidity issues in the financial sector of the Eurozone, the first supplementary longer-term refinancing oper-
ation (LTRO) of ECB with a six-month maturity was announced in March 2008. Between April 2008 and October 2011, the
ECB conducted twenty LTROs with six-month maturity. Details of the ECB’s announcements can be found in their website:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html
27This is within the range of the values used in the literature. For instance, GKa conduct experiments with a response coefficient of 100,













are only two countries in this setting, due to jump in private and public capital flows, current account becomes476
uninformative vis-à-vis to the data under UMP.477
Although the collapse in bank lending is improved under policy, it is still more severe than in the data. This is478
probably due to abstracting from regulatory measures taken by Spanish authorities during the post-crisis period.28479
Moreover, in the model, there are no frictions between intermediaries and firms, which implies efficient credit480
flows. In the presence of frictions between intermediaries and firms, it is possible to observe firm overborrowing.481
Finally, Figure 4 compares the dynamics under central bank asset purchases (AP) with liquidity facilities (LF).482
The figure shows that AP are slightly better at ameliorating the economy when equal amount of central bank483
fire-power is in place under both options. There are two counter-acting effects in efficiency of AP over LF. First484
effect is due to the design of the information asymmetry: financial frictions are between households and bankers,485
and there are no frictions between firms and banks. Hence, for any additional unit of funding one would expect an486
efficient allocation of credit across sectors and LF to be more effective than AP. However, there is another effect487
under the case in this paper. With the magnitude of these policies taking bank Lagrangian multiplier to negative488
territory, spreads between central bank liquidity rate and risk-free rate become negative. Negative spreads imply489
central bank funding being cheaper than private deposits, and hence crowd out private deposits in the bank balance490
sheet. This is violation of Bagehot (1873) principle: “Central bank liquidity should be extended against eligible491
collateral and at a penalty rate.” Violation of Bagehot (1873) leads to AP being more effective in ameliorating the492
economy than LF.493
5. Conclusions494
A quantitative, two-country, macroeconomic model in which banks face endogenous leverage constraints is495
developed to study the role of the financial sector in affecting domestic resource allocation and cross-border496
capital flows. International financial integration through bank balance sheets amplify and propagate fluctuations497
through banking and trade channels that reinforce each other. The results are relevant because the recent consensus498
narrative on the Eurozone crisis (e.g., Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015) suggests a similar view: “Capital flows tended499
to feed non-tradable sectors in the periphery of the Eurozone, and when the investors lost trust in deficit nations,500
the effects of a sudden-stop were amplified due to the predominance of bank financing.” This paper contributes501
to this debate by providing a rigorous framework for this consensus view. I further showed that unconventional502
policy that is reminiscent of the ECB’s is effective at ameliorating the economy.503
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Figure 1: Model and Data
Note: The straight lines show the paths of current account (Panel A), bank credit to traded and non-traded sectors (Panel B), and the share
of non-traded sector in overall production (Panel C) after feeding in the shocks to the frictional cost of cross-border bank deposits, ιt , in the
model. Dashed lines show the data of Spanish current account-to-GDP (Panel A), percent deviation of bank lending to non-financial sectors














Figure 2: Heterogeneity in Bank Assets and International Trade
Note: Blue lines show dynamics of selected model variables after feeding in the shocks to the frictional cost of cross-border deposits, ιt , in
the baseline model. Black lines show dynamics from the model when banking sector parameters are set such that λT = λNT = 0.1892, all else













Figure 3: Model and Data with Unconventional Policy
Note: The straight lines show the paths of current account (Panel A), bank credit to traded and non-traded sectors (Panel B), and the share of
non-traded sector in overall production (Panel C) after feeding in the shocks to the frictional cost of cross-border bank deposits, ιt , in the model.
Straight black lines show the model performance when unconventional policies are in place. Dashed lines show the data of Spanish current
account-to-GDP (Panel A), percent deviation of bank lending to non-financial sectors from 1999:IV (Panel B), and the share of non-traded













Figure 4: Comparison of Unconventional Policies
Note: Blue lines show dynamics of selected model variables after feeding in the shocks to the frictional cost of cross-border deposits, ιt , in
the baseline model. Black lines show dynamics from the model when liquidity facilities are in place during the bust, whereas red lines show














Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comments
Discount factor β 0.995 Standard RBC value
Risk aversion coefficient ρ 2 Standard RBC value
Relative weight of labor in the utility $ 5.584 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
Inverse Frisch elasticity (T sector) ϕ1 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Inverse Frisch elasticity (NT sector) ϕ2 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Deposit adjustment η 0.0025 Standard RBC value
Inverse elasticity of substitution between Home
and Foreign goods
ω 1.2 Standard RBC value
Inverse elasticity of substitution between traded
and non-traded goods
κ 1 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
Investment adjustment ϕK 5 Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999)
Depreciation δ 0.025 Standard RBC value
Home bias aH 0.55 To match data properties
Share of tradable sector aT 0.55 To match data properties
Share of capital in production α 0.33 Standard RBC value
Exit probability of intermediaries γ 0.975 Bank survival of 10 years
Fraction of start-up funds ε 0.0001 Small effect of banker entry-exit
Tradable sector asset diversion λT 0.2185 To match a steady-state spread in
NT sector of 120 bps, in T sector of
40bps, when leverage ratio is 6.
Non-tradable sector asset diversion λNT 0.6556
558
19
